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Legal privilege for in-house lawyers in the light of AKZO: a matter of law or 
policy? 
Luca Schicho (*) 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper discusses the arguments in favour of extending legal privilege to in-house lawyers 
in the light of the CJEU‟s judgement in AKZO. The previous jurisprudence is unambiguous, as 
the Court clearly stated in AM & S that the confidentiality of written communications between 
an undertaking and its lawyer is protected under Union law only when two cumulative 
conditions are fulfilled: they must be connected to the exercise of the client‟s rights of defence 
and the lawyer must be independent, that is, “not bound to the client by a relationship of 
employment”.
1
 This protection also applies to internal notes confined to reporting the content 
of communications with independent lawyers containing legal advice.
2
 
Scholars and practitioners have repeatedly criticized the Court‟s approach as restrictive and 
formalistic, calling for an extension of legal privilege to communications with in-house lawyers. 
An opportunity for doing so would have been the proceedings in AKZO. The case concerned 
an inspection in Manchester in February 2003 by officials of the Commission and the Office of 
Fair Trading. The officials gathered a series of documents which they categorized separately, 
namely the “series A documents”, consisting of notes of the director with a note stating 
“discussed by phone with external lawyer”, and the “series B documents”, consisting of two 
emails and handwritten notes by the director to the undertaking‟s in-house lawyer. The 
Commission refused to grant legal privilege to the series B documents, invoking Art. 14(3) of 
Regulation 17.
3
 Subsequently, the undertakings brought an action for annulment of the 
decision. 
In their judgements, neither the CFI nor the CJEU felt an urgent need to reconsider their 
jurisprudence. To the contrary, they confirmed AM & S and thereby at least temporarily put an 
end to this debate, removing all doubts about the scope of legal privilege.
4
 The paper briefly 
outlines the main arguments raised in favour of extending legal privilege as well as the 
judgement of the CFI and the Opinion delivered by AG Kokott, and then examines the 
passages of the CJEU judgement addressing each argument. 
                                                          
(*) Academic assistant at the College of Europe in Bruges, European Legal Studies Department. 
1 Case 155/79 AM & S v Commission [1982] ECR 1575, § 27. 
2 Case T-30/89 Hilti v Commission [1990] ECR II-163, §§ 13, 16-18. 
3 Corresponding to Art. 20(4) in Regulation 1/2003, which requires that undertakings submit to inspections 
ordered by decision of the Commission. 
4 D. VOILLEMOT, A.-G. HAIE, “L‟arrêt « Akzo » : la Cour confirme que les correspondances entre un avocat 
interne et son entreprise ne sont pas couvertes par la confidentialité”, [2010] L'Observateur de Bruxelles 
26, at 30 ; in the words of the President of European Company Lawyer‟s Association, supporters of an 
extension of legal privilege were “back at square one” as in 1982, see ECLA, “ECJ Ruling Press Release” 
(14 September 2010, available at http://www.ecla.org/wp-content/uploads/ECLA_Press_Release.pdf). 
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2. Arguments for extending legal privilege to in-house lawyers 
Three mains arguments have been raised in favour of extending legal privilege to in-house 
lawyers, both by scholars and the applicants in AKZO. First, it is argued that the 
“independence gap” between external and in-house lawyers is often quite small, as in-house 
lawyers are also subject to professional rules imposed by bar associations or other 
professional associations when acting as legal counsel. These rules supposedly guarantee 
that in-house lawyers will de-facto enjoy a sufficient degree of independence from their 
employer. Furthermore, an external lawyer may be in a relationship of comparable economic 
dependence if his activities for the respective undertaking constitute an important share of his 
overall professional activities. Thus, there might be very little factual difference between the 
relationship of an undertaking to its external lawyer and its in-house lawyer.
5
 
Second, while legal privilege was clearly limited to external lawyers at the time of AM & S, 
Member States are allegedly moving towards extending legal privilege, a tendency that 
should be reflected in Union law. This argument is linked to concerns of legal certainty arising 
from the differing scopes of legal privilege. When subject to an inspection, undertakings are 
presented the written authorization showing which agency authorised the inspection, together 
with an explanatory memorandum outlining their investigative powers.
6
 However, it is not 
necessarily clear which competition authority will later take up the investigation.
7
 Thus, the 
differing degrees of protection are said to undermine essential rights of defence. 
Third, reference has been made to the detrimental effects of excluding in-house lawyers from 
legal privilege on the effectiveness of internal compliance schemes. A large part of 
competition law infringements do not result from official policies of undertakings but from 
covert practices that have developed in mid-level management. Thus, internal compliance 
schemes targeting such practices can make an important contribution to the effectiveness of 
competition law and should be encouraged. In-house lawyers are often best placed to operate 
such schemes, as they have better access to the enterprise and the necessary sectoral 
expertise.
8
 Refusing them legal privilege discourages employees from thoroughly cooperating 
with them, as such cooperation could mean providing documents forming the basis for an 
eventual prosecution of the individual for competition law offences.
9
 It also may lead in-house 
                                                          
5 H. WOHLMANN, “Die Entscheidung "Akzo" des Europäischen Gerichtshofes, 1. Instanz, vom 17. September 
2007 und seine Auswirkungen auf Unternehmensanwälte”, (2008) 5 Zeitschrift für Gemeinschaftsrecht 
293, at 294; M. SCHMID-DRÜNER, “Legal Professional Privilege after Akzo - Case Closed, One Companies' 
Struggle Against Legal Uncertainty”, [2011] Bucerius Law Journal, 25, at 28. 
6 L. ORTIZ BLANCO ET AL., EC Competition Procedure, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, p. 298, 
303. 
7 M. SCHMID-DRÜNER, “Legal Professional Privilege after Akzo - Case Closed, One Companies' Struggle 
Against Legal Uncertainty”, [2011] Bucerius Law Journal 25, at 30. 
8 C. SEITZ, “Ein Schritt vor und zwei zurück? – Zum letzten Stand des Anwaltsgeheimnisses für 
Unternehmensanwälte im Europäischen Kartellverfahren - – Kurzbesprechung der Schlussanträge der 
Generalanwältin Juliane Kokott vom 29. 4. 2010 – C-550/07 P (Akzo Nobel/Kommission)”, [2010] 
Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 524, at 526; M. BUNTSCHECK, “Attorney-client correspondence 
- a contribution towards a well-ordered course of justice or rather a 'ticking bomb‟”, [2007] Wirtschaft und 
Wettbewerb, 229, at 233. 
9 A. ZELLHOFER, P. REICHERT, “Der Schutz von Anwaltskorrespondenz nach Akzo Nobel – ein Privileg externer 
Anwälte und ihrer Mandanten”, [2011] Österreichische Zeitschrift für Kartell- und Wettbewerbsrecht 43, at 
45. 
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lawyers to refrain from directly and unambiguously raising competition law concerns, as any 
such concerns expressed in written form could be used against the undertaking in case they 
are seized during an inspection.  
3.  The judgement of the CFI 
The judgement of the CFI did not uphold the arguments in favour of an extension of legal 
privilege. However, in the order on interim measures of 30 October 2003, the President 
seemed to hint that such an extension was being considered, cautiously noting that “evidence 
none the less appears prima facie to be capable of showing that the role assigned to 
independent lawyers of collaborating in the administration of justice [...] is now capable of 
being shared, to a certain degree, by certain categories of lawyers employed within 
undertakings on a permanent basis where they are subject to strict rules of professional 
conduct”
10
 and then concluding, a little more boldly, that “there is no presumption that the link 
of employment between a lawyer and an undertaking will always, and as a matter of principle, 
affect the independence necessary” for enjoying legal privilege.
11
 
Whatever expectations applicants and scholars may have had after this observation,
12
 the 
final judgement of the CFI stood by the Court‟s previous restrictive approach. The CFI first 
recalled the conditions required by the Court in AM & S, namely that legal advice was 
provided in full independence, that is, by a lawyer structurally, hierarchically and functionally a 
third party in relation to the undertaking receiving that advice.
13
 It further noted that it was not 
possible to “identify tendencies which are uniform or have clear majority support in that regard 
in the laws of the Member States”
14
 and that “a large number of Member States still exclude 
in-house lawyers from protection” or even prohibit in-house counsel from being members of 
the respective bar or law society while being employees of their client-corporation.
15
 Finally, 
with regard to the allegedly comparable situation of external and in-house lawyers, the CFI 
held that they are “clearly in very different situations, owing, in particular, to the functional, 
structural and hierarchical integration of in-house lawyers within the companies that employ 
them.”
16
 
Besides the central question of legal privilege for in-house lawyers, the CFI also made other 
important statements on the scope of legal privilege. It rejected the summary examination of 
what documents are subject to privilege undertaken by the Commission.
17
 Furthermore, it 
discussed the applicant‟s contention that documents created in the context of the compliance 
                                                          
10 Joined Cases T-125/03 and T-253/03 Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission [2007] 
ECR II-3523, § 125. 
11 Ibid., § 126. 
12 G. MURPHY, “CFI Signals Possible Extension of Professional Privilege to In-house Lawyers”, (2004) 25 
European Competition Law Review 447, at 469. 
13 Joined Cases T-125/03 and T-253/03 Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission [2007] 
ECR II-3523, § 168. 
14 Ibid., § 170. 
15 Ibid., § 171. 
16 Ibid., § 174. 
17 Ibid., § 101. 
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programme should not be excluded from the possibility of enjoying legal privilege, in particular 
due to the necessity to undertake a fact-finding exercise and gather material evidence for a 
leniency application, which would then be subject of communication with an external lawyer.
18
 
The Commission opposed this view, observing that legal privilege must be limited to written 
communications between lawyer and client and subsequent reports on the contents of such 
communications, excluding preceding preparatory documents.
19
 In particular, legal privilege 
could not be understood as extending to documents created within the context of a 
compliance programme, since such programme has the purpose “of ascertaining whether the 
undertaking is complying with competition law and has a pedagogical, disciplinary and 
supervisory dimension, and thus is not limited to protection of the rights of the defence.”
20
 
The CFI held that for being able to effectively consult an external lawyer, “it may be necessary 
[…] for the client to prepare working documents or summaries, in particular as a means of 
gathering information which will be useful, or essential, to that lawyer for an understanding of 
the context, nature and scope of the facts for which his assistance is sought” and that the 
protection of such documents may be necessary to safeguard the rights of defence.
21
 This 
would be the case were such preparatory documents were drawn up “exclusively for the 
purpose of seeking legal advice from a lawyer in exercise of the rights of the defence” even if 
they were neither exchanged with the lawyer nor created for the purpose of being physically 
sent to him.
22
 However, legal privilege as an exception to the Commission‟s powers of 
investigation must be construed restrictively and it is thus for the undertaking to prove that 
documents “were drawn up with the sole aim of seeking legal advice from a lawyer”.
23
 In the 
light of this burden of evidence, the CFI finally held that the undertakings had failed to prove 
this and thus rejected the plea concerning legal privilege for these documents.
24
 While these 
findings enjoyed less spotlight than the central debate over in-house lawyers, they 
nonetheless represent important contributions to outlining how legal privilege imposes 
procedural constraints on inspections
25
 further developing the AM & S jurisprudence.
26
 
4.  The Opinion of AG Kokott 
AG Kokott first noted that AM & S required two cumulative conditions to be fulfilled for 
documents to be covered by legal privilege: connection with the rights of defence and 
independence of the lawyer. With regard to the latter, she emphasized that the requirement 
was “unequivocally linked to the fact that the lawyer in question must not be in a relationship 
                                                          
18 Ibid., § 108. 
19 Ibid., §§ 113, 114. 
20 Ibid., § 116. 
21 Ibid., § 122. 
22 Ibid., § 123. 
23 Ibid., § 124. 
24 Ibid., § 134. 
25 E.G. FOURNIER, “The Modernisation of European Competition Law, First Experiences with Regulation 1-
2003” (Report to FIDE Congress 2008, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1139776), p. 67. 
26 L. TOMÉ FÉTEIRA, “Legal professional privilege and Competition Law”, [2007] European Law Reporter 392, 
at 397. 
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of employment with his client”.
27
 This strict requirement is explained by the fact that whatever 
professional ethical obligations may be associated with membership to a bar or law society, 
an enrolled in-house lawyer is still “less able to deal effectively with any conflicts of interest 
between his professional obligations and the aims and wishes of his client than an external 
lawyer”.
28
 Even where schemes of professional ethics are exemplary, they are not capable of 
guaranteeing that in-house lawyers are “genuinely free from direct or indirect pressure and 
influence in the course of day-to-day business”, a question determined “rather by the conduct 
and attitude adopted by his employer on each individual occasion”.
29
 While conceding that 
even external lawyers may enjoy de-facto limited independence vis-à-vis particularly 
important clients, an in-house lawyer still remains economically more dependent and more 
closely tied to the undertaking by personal identification.
30
  
Concerning the development of the legal framework in the Member States, AG Kokott 
affirmed that there was “no evidence of a clear – let alone growing – trend towards” extending 
legal privilege.
31
 Concerns about legal certainty due to differing degrees of protection in the 
different legal system are “entirely understandable [but] none the less untenable from a legal 
point of view”: the respective rules are not harmonised by the Union legislator and 
harmonisation cannot and should not be brought about indirectly by a broad judicial 
interpretation of the rights of defence.
32
 
With regard to the role of in-house lawyers in internal compliance schemes, AG Kokott 
expressed scepticism about the extent to which this should determine the scope of legal 
privilege. First, she observed that the in-house lawyer‟s close relationship to the undertaking 
may be a “double-edged sword” undermining his ability to give the genuinely independent 
legal advice necessary for these purposes.
33
 Furthermore, she raised an important objection 
to linking compliance and legal privilege, as communications exchanged with an in-house 
lawyer for compliance purposes would be general in nature and have no specific connection 
with the exercise of the rights of defence. It would therefore be very difficult to prove that the 
first condition laid down in AM & S was fulfilled.
34
 
5.  The judgement of the CJEU 
5.1. The de-facto equivalence argument 
With respect to de-facto equivalence in the light of professional obligations, the CJEU stated 
that “the concept of the independence of lawyers is determined not only positively, that is by 
reference to professional ethical obligations, but also negatively, by the absence of an 
                                                          
27 Opinion of AG Kokott, Case C-550/07 P Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission 
[2010], not yet reported, § 58. 
28 Ibid., § 61. 
29 Ibid., § 64. 
30 Ibid., § 66, 67, 70. 
31 Ibid., § 100. 
32 Ibid., § 132, 134. 
33 Ibid., § 118. 
34 Ibid., § 120. 
 8 
employment relationship”.
35
 This derives from the fact that his position as an employee “by its 
very nature, does not allow him to ignore the commercial strategies pursued by his employer, 
and thereby affects his ability to exercise professional independence”.
36
 Consequently, 
whatever professional ethical obligations he might be subject to, these do not “alter the 
economic dependence and personal identification of a lawyer in an employment relationship 
with his undertaking”.
37
 Thus, differences between in-house- and external lawyer are too 
profound to make the two comparable and precluding any possible breaches of equal 
treatment as suggested by applicants.
38
 
Deciding to ignore these differences would not only mean ignoring the strict line that the Court 
consciously and expressly drew in AM & S. It would also fail to increase legal certainty, as an 
extension on a case by case basis would require taking into account the different professional 
ethical obligations imposed by each bar association and balancing these with the provisions 
of each employment contract.
39
 This would result in highly casuistic, unpredictable decisions 
rather than contributing to legal certainty for undertakings.
40
 
5.2.  The uniformity and legal certainty argument 
The CJEU held that while comparatively more Member States are now granting legal privilege 
to in-house lawyers than at the time of AM & S, there is still no majority or “dominating 
tendency” in this direction: the majority of Member States still excludes correspondence with 
in-house lawyers from legal privilege, and a considerable number even prohibits in-house 
lawyers from being admitted to the bar.
41
 Thus, the CJEU considered that the “legal situation 
in the Member States of the European Union has not evolved, since the judgment in AM & S 
Europe v Commission was delivered, to an extent which would justify a change in the case-
law”.
42
 
With regard to the legal certainty argument, it noted that undertakings cannot invoke legal 
certainty to demand an extension of the principle, as there is a clear ratione materiae division 
of competences between national competition law authorities and the Commission as well as 
between EU competition law and national competition law.
43
 Thus, while there can indeed be 
                                                          
35 Case C-550/07 P. Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros Chemicals Ltd v European Commission [2010], 
not yet reported, § 45. 
36 Ibid., § 47. 
37 Ibid., § 57. 
38 Ibid., § 58. 
39 As implied by AG Kokott in her reference to “circumstances on each individual occasion”, see Opinion of AG 
Kokott, Case C-550/07 P Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission [2010], not yet 
reported, § 64. 
40 A. ANDREANGELI, “Joined Cases T-125/03 and 253/03, AKZO Nobel Chemicals Ltd v Ackros Chemicals Ltd 
v Commission, Judgment of 17 September 2007”, [2008] European Business Law Review 1141, at 1157. 
41 Case C-550/07 P. Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros Chemicals Ltd v European Commission [2010], 
not yet reported, § 71, 72; in particular in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, France, Italy, 
Cyprus, Luxembourg, Hungary, Austria, Romania, Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, Finland and Sweden, 
see Opinion of AG Kokott, Case C-550/07 P Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission 
[2010], not yet reported, § 100. 
42 Case C-550/07 P. Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros Chemicals Ltd v European Commission [2010], 
not yet reported, § 76. 
43 Ibid., § 102. 
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a different degree of protection for different investigations, undertakings subject to 
investigations are capable of assessing these differences, based on the written authorisation 
presented by the officials during the investigation. 
The judgement squarely rejects the argument of a “tendency towards legal privilege for in-
house lawyers”. However, its reference to the fact that the legal situation “has not evolved to 
an extent justifying a change in the case-law” signals that in case such a broad shift towards 
extending legal privilege should indeed occur in the future, the CJEU would consider mirroring 
that development in Union law.
44
 
5.3.  The effects argument: Effect on internal compliance schemes 
The effect of legal privilege for in-house lawyers on compliance schemes was also raised as 
an argument by applicants. They argued that an extension of legal privilege should result from 
“the development of European Union law, resulting in particular from the entry into force of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003” and the “need for in-house legal advice, the importance 
of which should not be underestimated in preventing infringements of competition law, since 
in-house lawyers are able to rely on intimate knowledge of the undertakings and their 
activities”.
45
 
The CJEU noted that the introduction of Regulation 1/2003 resulted in many changes of 
procedure, but these “do not suggest that they require lawyers in independent practice and in-
house lawyers to be treated in the same way with respect to legal professional privilege, since 
that principle is not at all the subject-matter of the regulation”.
46
 Furthermore, the CJEU 
emphasized that the Regulation is not meant to ensure equal treatment of in-house and 
external lawyers, but to the contrary, it defines the powers of the Commission broadly, aiming 
to “reinforce the extent of the Commission‟s powers of inspection, in particular as regards 
documents which may be the subject of such measures”.
47
 
The arguments with regard to prevention and internal compliance are not without merit. 
However, they are based less on considerations of principle than on “utilitarian or instrumental 
considerations relating to the effectiveness and efficiency of antitrust enforcement”.
48
 This 
understanding of legal privilege is neither uncontested nor, if taken further, necessarily very 
satisfactory: If the utilitarian approach is applied radically, “there is a case to be made for 
withdrawing any privilege whatsoever for legal communications involving completed or even 
ongoing conduct, and for protecting only communications containing legal advice about future 
                                                          
44 Reflecting the fact that legal privilege derives from the general principles of law common to all Member 
States, see Case 155/79 AM & S v Commission [1982] ECR 1575, §§ 18-22, 24-27; Case C-550/07 P. 
Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros Chemicals Ltd v European Commission [2010], not yet reported, §§ 
69, 71-76. 
45 Ibid., § 78, 79; also see, with regard to this alleged impact of Regulation 1/2003 on the role of in-house 
lawyers, V. POWER, “Representing clients after the Modernisation of EC Competition law”, (2003) 14 
International Company and Commercial Law Review 335 at 336. 
46Ibid., § 83. 
47 Ibid., §§ 85, 86. 
48 W.P.J. WILS, “Powers of Investigation and Procedural Rights and Guarantees in EU Antitrust Enforcement, 
The Interplay between European and National Legislation and Case-Law”, (2006) 29 World Competition 3, 
at 21. 
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conduct”, as it is only concerning such future conduct that clients could be encouraged to 
have recourse to expert legal advice and respectively adapt their behaviour.
49
 
The Court‟s AM & S jurisprudence, on the other hand, is founded on a non-utilitarian 
conception of legal privilege, concerned with the rights of defence of the undertaking under 
investigation, rather than the wider implications on antitrust enforcement.
50
 This not only 
derives from the Court‟s understanding of legal privilege as a fundamental rights-based 
exception to the Commissions investigative powers. It also expresses a deeper feeling that 
with regard to the scope of legal privilege, “extracting a rule from balancing competing policies 
is more appropriately the realm of the legislature”.
51
 
6.  Conclusions and Outlook 
Overall, the strongest argument in favour of extending legal privilege of in-house lawyers is 
not one of competition law, but rather of antitrust enforcement policy. It should also be kept in 
mind in this respect that, as AG Kokott emphasized, general compliance-related 
communications would often already fail to fulfil the first criterion of connection to the exercise 
of defence rights. Legal privilege is considered to apply to correspondence concerning 
matters at least dealt with informally by the Commission before the opening of the file.
52
 The 
very purpose of correspondence concerning compliance, on the other hand, is to avoid that 
the Commission ever has a reason to look into the matter. 
Consequently, the Court is not willing to broaden its concept of legal privilege to 
accommodate compliance concerns. Instead it seems to hint that it is up to the legislator to 
decide whether the beneficial effects on internal compliance and prevention outweigh the 
negative effects on enforcement arising from a restriction of investigative powers. Should 
there be a broad consensus that this balancing justifies an extension of legal privilege to in-
house lawyers under Union law, this could be laid down unambiguously by an amendment of 
Art. 20 of Regulation 1/2003.
53
 It is doubtful, however, whether initiating a proposal for such 
an amendment would be among the legislative priorities of the Commission.
54
 
Alternatively, such a consensus may be reflected in a modification of national competition law 
provisions extending legal privilege, which the Court would be willing to follow by equally 
extending the scope of legal privilege under Union law. Until that happens, however, the 
Court will stand by its restrictive approach to legal privilege for in-house lawyers. 
                                                          
49 E.G. FOURNIER, “Legal Professional Privilege in Competition Proceedings Before the European 
Commission: Beyond the Cursory Glance”, (2005) 28 Fordham International Law Journal 967, at 981. 
50 Ibid., at 1031-1032. 
51 Ibid., at 988. 
52 L. ORTIZ BLANCO ET AL., EC Competition Procedure, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, p. 319-
320. 
53 As envisaged by an amendment proposal when the Regulation was adopted, which was, however, rejected 
by a vote of 404 to 69, with 9 abstentions in the European Parliament, see Opinion of the Economic and 
Social Committee on the “Regulation implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty” of 29 March 2001, OJ 
C/2001/155/73 and European Parliament Opinion in Single Reading of 6 September 2001, OJ C 
E/2002/72/311. 
54 N. TUOMINEN, “Commentaire de l‟Arrêt „Akzo Nobel v. Commission‟”, Revue du Droit de l'Union Européenne 
nr. 4/2010. 
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